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Social workers'judgments about the determinants of clients' problems have a substantial
effect on practitioners' willingness to provide assistance. There is considerable variation
in professionals' beliefs about the extent to which clients are themselves responsible
for their difficulties, as opposed to factors that are beyond their control. This article
examines the philosophical controversy known as the free will-determinism debate,
and assesses its implications for the profession of social work.

In the fall of 1982, Time magazine featured a cover story on the dismal
status of the U.S. prison system. During the week following its appearance, two letters to the editor were published in response to the
article's commentary on our nation's correctional institutions and their
inmates:
To theEditors:
When considering prisons, it should be kept in mind that every inmate is
there by choice. He made the decision to do time the moment he committed
the crime.
To theEditors:
Our genes and our environmentcontrolour destinies.The idea of conscious
choice is ridiculous. Yes, prisons should be designed to protect society, but
they should not punish the poor slobs who were headed for jail from birth.'
The juxtaposition of these letters is, of course, striking. Their authors
clearly view the world through radically different lenses. The first is
Social Service Review (December 1983).
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committed to the view that individuals who violate our laws and statutes
do so deliberately, willingly, and rationally. In short, criminals know
what they are doing, and simply take calculated risks to which are
attached, at least in principle, well publicized penalties. From the point
of view of the second author, those convicted of breaking the law are
essentially victims of misshapen genes or toxic environmental circumstances that have led them forcibly down one of life's wayward paths.
These contrasting views concerning the determinants of human
misbehavior represent one of the most enduring controversies in recorded history, commonly known as the free will-determinism debate.
Put briefly, on one side are those who argue that human beings are
willful actors who actively shape their own destinies and who independently make rational choices based on personal preferences and
wishes. On the other side are those who claim that human behavior
is largely or entirely determined by a series of antecedent events and
factors, such that any given "choice" or behavior is a mere product of
prior causes, be they psychological, environmental, mechanical, or
physical.

Implications for Social Work
The free will-determinism debate is remarkably relevant to the practice
of social work in at least two general ways. First, social workers repeatedly
make assumptions about the determinants and malleability of clients'
problems and shape interventions or treatment plans accordingly. Mental
retardation, we may conclude, is a function of certain chromosomal
abnormalities and is thus amenable to only a limited range of treatment
approaches. Family discord, on the other hand, may emerge as a result,
for example, of personality quirks of family members, the strain of a
sudden illness, financial catastrophe, or certain learning disabilities.
Poverty, we might argue, stems from individual lethargy, structural
problems in our economy that lead to high rates of unemployment,
or physical disabilities. How we respond to these problems-whether
we focus our attention on environmental determinants, health problems,
or individual character-frequently depends on assumptions that we
make about the extent to which people's problems are the result of
factors over which they have control.
Second, the conclusions that social workers reach about the causal
determinants of clients' difficulties frequently lead to assumptions about
the extent to which they deserve assistance and whatever benefits or
services there are to offer. If we conclude that a client is chronically
depressed because of a series of unforeseen, tragic events in her life,
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we may be more inclined to offer solace and support than we would
be if we decide that her depression is a calculated, willful, protracted,
and self-serving attempt to gain sympathy and attention. If we conclude
that a client has difficulty retaining jobs because of a congenital disability
that he has tried persistently to overcome, we may be more willing to
invest our professional time and energy than we would with a client
who is fired from jobs repeatedly because he resents having to show
up for work at 8:30 A.M. each day. Thus, our willingness to attribute
responsibility for clients' problems to factors that are to some extent
beyond their control can affect our willingness to assist them. The
free will-determinism debate therefore has bearing not only on social
workers' beliefs about the causes of clients' difficulties and their capacity
to change but, as well, on their willingness to help them change.
One of the central pillars in the foundation of contemporary social
work is the value of self-determination, a concept that is closely tied
to assumptions about free will. Since the early 1900s, professional
social workers have been guided by the assumption that a key mission
of the profession is to help clients achieve what they want to achieve
and to assist them in the formation and pursuit of meaningful goals.
Underlying this principle, however, is a tacit assumption that clients
have the capacity to chart and shape their lives-that they are not like
billiard balls whose paths are fully determined by antecedent events and, further, that they deserve social workers' assistance. It is thus
clear that whatever position we take in the free will-determinism controversy, it stands to have a substantial effect on our inclination to
uphold the longstanding principle of self-determination. Florence Hollis
acknowledged this dilemma years ago in an address delivered at a
United Nations seminar concerning the advanced study of social work:
"The first question to be raised about these scientific principles is often
the philosophical one of whether the assumption of lawfulness in
behaviour and of cause and effect relationships in behaviour does not
mean that casework has become completely deterministic. How can
this be reconciled with the principle of self-determination?"''2

The Nature of the Debate
The free will-determinism debate actually has ancient philosophical
roots. Empedocles and Heraclitus, for example, are early sources of
pre-Socratic thought on the meaning of determinism in nature and
the idea of natural law. Ideas concerning determinism-especially the
influence of divine will-were later given prominence in the fourth
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century B.C. by the Stoics, the Greek school of philosophy founded
by Zeno.
The origins of modern world debate about free will and determinism
are ordinarily traced to the work of the eighteenth-century French
astronomer and mathematician Pierre Simon de Laplace. Laplace's
assertions about determinism in the world as we know it were heavily
dependent upon the scientific theory of particle mechanics, according
to which a knowledge of the mechanical state of all particles at some
particular time together with a knowledge of "all the forces acting in
nature" at that instant would enable one to discover all future and all
past states of the world. With this information, one could, in principle,
discover not only all future and past mechanical states in the world,
but all others as well, such as electromagnetic, chemical, and psychological.3
The contemporary philosophical debate, as I noted above, boils
down to a clash between those who credit human beings with the
ability to make rational willful choices and to act upon those choices,
least in part-of prior causes, and those who reject
independent-at
this view. Each ideological camp has noteworthy proponents whose
views range from the moderate to the extreme. For extreme determinists,
everything, including our thoughts, emotions, and behavior, is the
effect of some prior cause. As the philosopher Ernest Nagel has observed,
"determinism in its most general form appears to be the claim that
for every set of characteristics which may occur at any time, there is
some system that is deterministic in respect to those occurrences."4
The doctrine of determinism contains two essential ingredients: a
belief in universal causal laws and the concept of predictability. In
principle, any current state of affairs has identifiable determinants
and knowable, predictable outcomes. According to determinism, then,
problems such as mental illness, low self-esteem, poverty, crime, child
abuse, and drug abuse can be traced to historical antecedents that
have led progressively to the victim's current difficulties. The responsibility for the client's problems is not his or her own; rather, it resides
in the onset and consequences of prior events. The implication of the
determinist point of view, therefore, is that the client is not to be
considered culpable. He is not to be blamed for his unfortunate circumstances. It may appear, of course, that clients engage in the formulation of rational, independent choices; but this, after all, is only
an illusion, according to hard-core determinists. What appears to be
free choice is itself a product of earlier influences, which may be a
function of genetic endowment, physiology, child rearing, economics,
politics, and an impressive number of other factors.
This conclusion means more, however, than that clients are not
ultimately responsible for their problems. It also means that they are
able to do little or nothing of consequence to ameliorate them. For
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extreme determinists, the ability of individuals to make freely formed
decisions about their futures is nonexistent. Whatever ability we have
to change is merely the outcome of prior causes. The philosopher
John Hospers has described this view succinctly:
The position, then, is this: if we can overcomethe effects of earlyenvironment,
the ability to do so is itself a product of the early environment. We did not
give ourselvesthis ability;and if we lackit we cannot be blamedfor not having
it. Sometimes,to be sure, moral exhortationbrings out an abilitythat is there
but not being used, and in this lies its occasionalutility;but very often its use
is pointless, because the abilityis not there. The only thing that can overcome
a desire, as Spinoza said, is a stronger contrarydesire; and many times there
simply is no wherewithalfor producing a stronger contrarydesire. Those of
us who do have the wherewithalare lucky.5
Acceptance of this conclusion would clearly throw cold water on both
the mission and traditional methods of social work.
Proponents of the free will school of thought, alternatively, deny
that the thoughts, emotions, and behavior of all individuals are, at all
times, a function of prior causes over which individuals have little or
no control. Adherents to this point of view generally fall short of
claiming that no events are determined or that all events are truly
random occurrences. Rather, they claim that some events follow from
the exercise of free will or choice, that individuals do in fact have the
capacity to behave independent of prior causes, though to varying
degrees. As the ethicist Gerald Dworkin has noted, "The claim that
we have free will is, then, the claim that for some actions at least the
following condition is true: There is an alternative action (which may
be simply refraining from the action to be performed) open to the
agent. Put in the past tense after the agent has performed some action
A: There was some alternative action which the agent could have
performed other than the one which he in fact did."'6Formally, the
following argument attempts to establish the notion of free will and
deny determinism:
1. A necessary condition for holding a person responsible, blaming, or
punishing him for an act, A, is that the person did A freely.
2. If determinism is true nobody ever acts freely.
3. Therefore,if determinismis true, no one is ever responsible,blameworthy,
or punishable.
4. At least sometimes people are responsible,blameworthy,or punishable
for what they do.
5. Therefore, determinism is false.7
Recognizing that questions may be raised about the technical validity
of this argument, it represents, in sharp relief, the doctrine to which
determinists are opposed. And the implications of the conclusion of
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this syllogism are far from trivial. They bear heavily on the willingness
of social workers to exhort, motivate, and generally work hard with
clients to bring about meaningful changes in their lives.
An alternative to extreme views of either free will or determinism,
but which contains elements of both schools of thought, has become
known in philosophical circles as the "mixed view" or "soft determinism."
It is fair to say that currently the mixed view is the most prominent
in circulation. It essentially entails three assumptions: (1) that the thesis
of determinism is generally true, and that accordingly all human behavior-both voluntary and nonvoluntary-is preceded and caused
by antecedent conditions, such that no other behavior is possible; (2)
that genuinely voluntary behavior is nonetheless possible to the extent
that it is not coerced; and (3) that, in the absence of coercion, voluntary
behavior is brought about by the decisions, choices, and preferences
of the individual himself.8 According to the mixed view, then, human
behavior is neither wholly determined by external forces nor entirely
random in nature. There is considerable room for voluntary action.

The Compatibility Argument
There is considerable evidence that the doctrine of soft determinism
is relatively prominent in the profession of social work. In general,
both the profession's literature and conventional practice wisdom embrace the view that the problems under which clients labor are frequently
the products of circumstances beyond their control, to varying degrees,
and that clients themselves are at times partly responsible for their
difficulties and are-again, to varying degrees-capable
of making
thoughtful, rational, and voluntary decisions to alter the course of
their lives. Florence Hollis has summarized this sentiment well: "The
casework position, I would think, would not be that of absolutism in
either direction. We certainly do not take the libertarian stand that
each action of man is completely free and unaffected by his previous
character, life history, or current experience. On the other hand, neither
do we believe that all choice, all behavior is the determined, necessary
and inflexible result of previously existing physical or environmental
causes."9
This position is based on what philosophers generally refer to as
the compatibility argument, according to which the free will and determinist views are not, contrary to first impressions, necessarily mutually
exclusive. Rather, they can be complementary. This is a view that has
been espoused over the years by such noteworthy philosophers as
Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill.1o
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The compatibility doctrine is thus in sharp contrast to the view of
those who argue that to admit the possibility of free will is to deny
determinism, and vice versa. According to the so-called incompatibilist,
the world and its events cannot be explained by appealing to both the
free will and determinism doctrines. As the philosopher Richard Taylor
has observed with respect to the incompatibility thesis, "Ultimate responsibility for anything that exists, and hence for any man and his
deeds, can thus only rest with the first cause of all things, if there is
such a cause, or nowhere at all, in case there is not.""
Though the predominant view in social work is generally consistent
with soft determinism, it is nonetheless clear that there is considerable
variation of opinion within the profession about the extent to which
clients are truly victims of circumstances and prior determinants beyond
their control, as opposed to willful actors who have brought their
difficulties upon themselves. For example, in their recent review of
the ideological assumptions, contained, either implicitly or explicitly,
in introductory social work texts, Ephross and Reisch document considerable variation in authors' emphases on cultural, economic, political,
and environmental determinants of social problems."2 The texts fell
generally into three groups: (1) those that attribute clients' difficulties
largely to factors that are beyond their control; (2) those that stress
the capacity of individuals to fashion their own lives and futures, while
recognizing somewhat the effects of external factors; and (3) those
that stand midway between these two positions, in that they acknowledge
clearly "the connections between social work clients and societal forces
and events."'"Though their discussion is not couched in the philosophical
language of the free will-determinism debate, it is clear that Ephross
and Reisch grasp the implications of the controversy for social work
when they conclude that:
there are clear differences among the books reviewed as to social, political,
and economiccontent, and it seems that these differencesare quite important
for the education of professionalsocialworkers.In a sense, one can distribute
these introductorytextbooksover an ideologicalspectrum.The temptationis
to visualizesuch a spectrumas covering a range from "Left"to "Right."These
terms are used a bit unconventionallyhere; they do not imply that the authors
adhere to all of the political views commonly associatedwith Left or Right
positions.Rather,the idea is of a scalewhose polarpoints describeconceptions
of the relationship between societal forces and individual experiences. The
Leftpole, then, encompassesthe positionthatindividuals'livesarecircumscribed
and heavilyinfluenced,if not determined,bypolitical,economic,andinstitutional
patterns within society. The Right pole attributesto individualsand families
a great deal of leeway to determine their individual and interpersonal experiences.'4
As observed above, the impressive variation in social workers' opinions
about the extent to which present and future circumstances are shaped

Free Will-Determinism

633

by voluntary versus deterministic factors has several noteworthy implications for professional practice. These implications can be placed
generally into two categories. First, there are implications related to
the views social workers have of the culpability and capacity of the
clients with whom they work. Second, there are implications concerning
the extent to which social workers believe clients deserve assistance.

The Culpability and Capacity of Clients
Though social workers are generally predisposed to identify and understand both individual and environmental determinants of clients'
problems, it is evident that our views of the extent to which clients
are responsible for their difficulties vary considerably. On the one
hand are clients whose problems seem due to circumstances well beyond
their control. These are clients who, we conclude, have not brought
problems upon themselves. They are true victims. Infants who have
been physically abused or neglected, people with congenital defects
(such as physical deformities or mental retardation), and those who
are diseased at birth are, by and large, regarded as clients who were
dealt an unfortunate hand at the very start of life. They have not
behaved in ways that we consider to have invited the serious problems
from which they suffer.
At the other extreme are clients who, we are at least at times inclined
to believe, have made voluntary decisions to lead their lives in ways
that produce serious problems. Thus, ablebodied poor and unemployed
who choose not to work merely because of their aversion to the task,
drug abusers, and criminals are frequently viewed as clients who have,
so to speak, asked for their troubles. Ablebodied poor could work,
drug abusers could abstain, and criminals could cease and desist if
they really wanted to. They have simply exercised their free will to
the contrary. A true determinist, of course, would argue that there
are reasons why these people have chosen their problem-laden lifestyles; they may suffer from a wide variety of intrapsychic maladies,
economic obstacles, or political impediments that prevent them from
behaving otherwise, though on the surface it appears that they have
voluntarily chosen their current circumstances. However, though there
may be some truth to the determinist's contentions in such cases, what
is important is that many social workers see these clients as culpableas exercising their free will-and this ultimately affects our professional
response to them.
Between these two extremes, of course, are those who seem to straddle
the free will-determinism fence. These are the clients about whom
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we are most ambivalent. In their cases we tend to feel torn, caught
between an intellectual understanding of the factors that may have
brought about their distress and the frustration of feeling that they
may have themselves contributed voluntarily to the problem in a significant way, or not done enough to remedy it. Withjuvenile delinquents,
for example, social workers have helped blaze a long-standing trail of
theory constructed to account for youthful mischief. There is by now
a familiar litany of factors cited to "explain" juvenile delinquency:
broken homes, child abuse, inferior education, poor role models, exposure to drugs, and so on. However, despite our intellectual understanding of the antecedents or determinants of delinquency, many of
us nonetheless are tempted to hold many of these youths responsible
for their misbehavior. If they would only care enough about themselves,
think about their behavior and the feelings of others more carefully,
and take a critical look at their own values, they could surely mend
their ways. In the final analysis, it is tempting to think that the fault
may be theirs. We sometimes think similarly about certain aged clients,
for example, whose forgetfulness, clumsiness, and poor hygiene may
annoy us; though their increasing frailty may "explain" their behavior,
it is at times tempting to believe that these nuisances could be relieved
considerably if they would only try harder. The same holds for those
clients who now make up a very substantial portion of the social work
profession's caseload: those who are experiencing one or more of a
wide range of emotional difficulties, such as poor self-esteem, marital
conflict, depression, loneliness, or some generalized form of anxiety.

The Boundaries of Moral Responsibility
The form and extent of the assistance that social workers choose to
provide for their clients are influenced in important ways by the degree
to which they hold their clients responsible for their problems. In this
respect, there is a close relationship in social work between the concepts
of moral responsibility and moral desert.
The concept of moral responsibility implies that individuals can, or
ought to be, held accountable for their problems and mischief. Of
course, to assert such a claim is to embrace, at least partially, the notion
of free will. It would, after all, be irrational to argue that an individual
whose problems are entirely due to factors beyond his or her control
(hard-core determinism) is one who should, at the same time, be held
accountable for them. To attribute fault or blame in such cases would
fly in the face of logic as we know it. As David Hume observed in his
eighteenth-century work, A Treatiseof Human Nature:

Free Will-Determinism

635

'Tis only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit
or demerit from his actions.... Actions are by their very nature temporary
and perishing;and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters
and dispositionof the person, who perform'dthem, they infix not themselves
upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if
evil. The actionin itself may be blameable .... But the personis not responsible
for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and constant,
and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its
account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.'"
Yet, though there may be general agreement within the profession
that clients whose problems are due to circumstances beyond their
control should not be held responsible for them, there is much less
clarity about what factors determine whether an individual is truly a
victim or not.
Centuries ago, Aristotle argued that an individual is responsible only
for those actions that are voluntary in nature. According to Aristotle,
there are two principal ways in which an action can fail to be voluntary:
it can be the result of compulsion, or it can be carried out in ignorance.'6
Thus, if an oncoming and recklessly driven auto forces you off the
road, and in doing so causes your passenger to be injured, you have
been compelled-due
to circumstances we would ordinarily consider
to be beyond your control-to act as you did. We would not be likely
to hold you morally responsible for your passenger's injuries. Further,
if there were some latent defect in your living room chair, and a guest
fell from it and harmed himself, common sense suggests that you
should not be held at fault.
A persistent problem, however, is that while there may be some
general agreement that coercion and ignorance preclude the assignment
of moral blame, social workers (and others) have had little success
reaching agreement about what, in fact, constitutes genuine coercion
and ignorance. Take the problem of poverty, for example. There is
at least a general predisposition in the profession to identify the following
factors as explaining why many people are poor: poor education,
racism and discrimination, Western capitalism, single-parent status,
poor health and nutrition, and a host of related liabilities. But, can
we say that these factors-acting independently or in concert--constitute coercion and ignorance in the strict sense? It is not hard for
us to agree that a gun held at our back or organic brain disease
constitute coercion (though in different forms). But what of factors
that are, at least according to conventional wisdom, highly correlated
with poverty? Is it reasonable to assert that these factors compel or
coerce individuals into poverty? Further, what, if any, distinctions
should we make between intraindividual factors (physiological or psychological), which can be coercive, and extraindividual factors? Clearly,
the degree to which we view poverty as a voluntary or coerced state
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has profound implications for our response to it. As the philosopher
in an essay on the concepts of free will, praise,
and blame:

J.J. C. Smart observed

When, in nineteenth-centuryEngland, the rich man brushed aside all considerationfor his unsuccessfulrivalsin the battle for wealthand position, and
looking at them as they starvedin the gutter said to himself, "Well,they had
the same opportunitiesas I had. If I took more advantageof them than they
did, that is not my fault but theirs,"he was most probablynot only callous
but (as I shall try to show) metaphysicallyconfused. A man who said "Heredity
and environment made me what I am and made them what they are"would
be lesslikelyto falla preyto thissortof callousnessand indifference.Metaphysical
views about free will are therefore practicallyimportant,and their importance
is often in inverse proportion to their clarity."7
A related problem concerns confusion about the distinction between
holding clients morally responsible for actions that they engage in and
actions that they fail to engage in. Child abuse, for example, is an act
of commission for which we are ordinarily inclined to hold individuals
at least partly responsible, though we may, to some extent, be able to
identify reasons that explain their behavior. Child neglect, on the other
hand, is an act of omission. Thus, it appears that the free will-determinism debate bears on failures to act, in addition to the more common
concern social workers have with clients whose acts of commission
draw attention.'8s
Ordinarily, three preconditions must be satisfied in order to hold
an individual liable for his or her actions or inaction. First, it must be
established that the individual committed the harmful act, or at least
that the action or omission made a substantial contribution to it. Second,
the individual's conduct must have been in some way faulty. Finally,
it must be established that there was a causal connection between the
faulty conduct and the reprehensible outcome.'9 Granted, it is often
difficult to establish the presence of these preconditions in social work.
The evidence is not always adequate to determine that a client did
commit or failed to commit the act of interest. Further, it is often hard
to know whether the conduct was in fact faulty and led to, in a causal
way, the regrettable outcome. Nonetheless, practitioners do, in their
day-to-day work, make such judgments about moral responsibility,
and these judgments affect the form and content of our responses to
clients' problems. As I will discuss below, our judgments about what
clients deserve are frequently predicated upon our attributions of
moral responsibility.

The Concept of Desert
The concept of desert has a variety of connotations, both in general
and in the profession of social work. These connotations may be positive,
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as in the case of awarding prizes or rewards for athletic, artistic, or
scholarly achievements, or negative, as in the case of penalties or
punishments imposed for misbehavior. Clients may deserve to be rewarded, such as when residents of a group home are awarded additional
privileges following a period of good behavior, or penalized, such as
when a client's unemployment benefits are discontinued due to the
reporting of false information. The concept of desert can also have
relatively neutral connotations, such as when retirement or workers'
compensation funds are distributed to those who deserve them. Therefore, the concept of desert is closely related to both retributive and
distributive justice. Retributive justice is concerned with penalties and
rewards. Distributive justice is concerned with allocating services and
resources.20
The free will-determinism debate, as it pertains to social work, is
most closely related to issues of retributive justice. That is, the extent
to which practitioners are likely to reward or penalize clients is likely
to be a function of their beliefs about the degree to which clients are
responsible for their behavior or problems. Consider, for example,
our response to criminals. Those of us who believe that armed robbers
are rational individuals who voluntarily decide to assault their victims
are tempted to endorse the imposition of penalties, in the name of
punishment, retribution, and, perhaps, deterrence. Justice demands
that the perpetrator be held accountable to the community for his or
her misdeeds. Immanuel Kant is ordinarily credited with the classic
statement concerning this so-called retributivist point of view:
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which publicjustice takes
as its principle and standard?It is just the principle of equality,by which the
pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than
the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any
one commitson another, is to be regardedas perpetratedon himself. ... This
is the right of retaliation (justalionis);and properly understood, it is the only
principlewhich in regulatinga publiccourt,as distinguishedfrom mere private
judgment, can definitelyassignboth the qualityand quantityofa just penalty.2'
A strict determinist, however, would make no such demands; unpleasant
but compelling reasons can be found to explain the offender's behavior.
It is simply inappropriate to conclude that the offense was the product
of rational free will. As the attorney Clarence Darrow once said to
inmates confined in Cook County (Chicago) Jail: "I do not believe in
any sort of distinction between the real moral conditions of the people
in and out of jail. . . . I do not believe that people are in jail because
they deserve to be. They are in jail simply because they cannot avoid
it on account of circumstances which are entirely beyond their control
and for which they are in no way responsible."22An excerpt from John
Hospers's classic essay, "What Means This Freedom?" summarizes suc-
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cinctly the determinist's position on this issue as viewed through the
philosopher's lens:
There are many actions-not those of an insane person (however the term
"insane"be defined), nor of a person ignorant of the effects of his action, nor
ignorant of some relevant fact about the situation, nor in any obvious way
mentally deranged-for which human beings in general and the courts in
particularare inclined to hold the doer responsible, and for which, I would
say,he should not be held responsible .... Let us takeas an example a criminal
who, let us say, strangled several persons and is himself now condemned to
die in the electric chair.Jury and public alike hold him fully responsible (at
least they utter the words "he is responsible"),for the murderswere planned
down to the minutest detail, and the defendant tells the jury exactly how he
planned them. But now we find out how it all came about;we learn of parents
who rejected him from babyhood, of the childhood spent in one foster home
after another, where it was always plain to him that he was not wanted; of
the constantlyfrustratedearlydesirefor affection,the hardshellof nonchalance
and bitterness that he assumed to cover the painful and humiliating fact of
being unwanted, and his subsequent attempts to heal these wounds to his
shattered ego through defensive aggression.23
A final comment is in order on the concept of desert and its relevance
to social work. Though our beliefs about the victimization of clients
frequently lead us to conclude that they should not be held accountable
for their actions (and therefore deserve assistance) on occasion our
sentiments about particular clients' moral worth can taint and dilute
these convictions. Social workers' long-standing involvement with the
poor illustrates this point. The profession has, generally speaking,
been cognizant of and sympathetic to the reasons why people are
poor. We are painfully aware that physical and mental disability, entrenched racism and discrimination, cyclical and structural unemployment, and age-factors over which individuals ordinarily do not
have much control-account for the lion's share of those who are
below the official poverty line. The percentage of poor who are genuinely
ablebodied is impressively low. Nonetheless, there can be found in
many professional social work circles at least a subtle contempt for
the poor, a feeling that, despite all we know, many of these people
neither appreciate nor, perhaps, are worthy of our various services
and ministrations. In some instances, our latent resentment of our
clients casts a shadow on our intellectual understanding of their status
as victim. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt commented on this problem
in an essay on the subject of coercion and moral responsibility:
We do on some occasions find it appropriateto make an adversejudgment
concerning a person's submissionto a threat, even though we recognise that
he has genuinely been coerced and that he is therefore not properly to be
held morallyresponsiblefor his submission.This is because we think that the
person, although he was in fact quite unable to control a desire, ought to
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have been able to control it.... It may be that we have a low opinion of
someone who is incapable of defying a threat of the kind in question; and
our judgment that he ought to have been able to defy it may express this
feeling that he is not much of a man. This has nothing to do with judging
him as deservingblame-if he should feel anything,it is not guilt but shameand it is entirely compatiblewith the belief that he had actuallyno choice but
to do what he did. Indeed it depends upon this belief. It is just because we
recognise that we cannot expect better from him that we hold him in a certain
contempt."24

The Paradox of Determinism
My comments thus far have concerned the implications of the free
will-determinism debate for the views social workers have of the culpability, capacity, and worthiness of clients. It is important to note,
however, that frequently issues related to free will and determinism
bear on clients' views of themselves, their interpretation of past events,
and their fantasies about the future. A letter that I recently received
from an inmate with whom I once worked in a state penitentiary
illustrates this. This young man is serving a sentence for murder.
During the course of our work together we had spent some time
speculating about why he killed the people he did. His case was complicated by the fact that he was under the influence of potent drugs
at the time of the murders.
The history of abuse and neglect to which this fellow had been
subjected as a child is filled with a series of disconcerting events.
Listening to his life story, it is no surprise that he followed a wayward
path. Yet until the night when he murdered neighbors he barely knewfor no apparent reason-he had committed no serious acts of violence
and had had only minor brushes with the law. He too found something
terribly mystifying about his crime. In the end, he could not help but
wonder whether he is ultimately responsible for what he had done:
"In my own case," he wrote, "I didn't want to kill anyone, didn't intend
to, and realized I had done so only after it was done. I guess that's
why I hate myself. Because I lost control of myself while on drugs
and killed three people. It's simple to say, well, I was on drugs and
didn't know what I was doing. But then no one forced the drugs on
me. I took them on my own free will. So who's to blame?"
One of the ironies of social work is that both members of the profession
and their clients tend to embrace simultaneously both the free will
and determinism doctrines. On the one hand, we persistently pursue
the discovery of grand psychological, sociological, political, and economic
theories that will enable us to fully grasp how and why people become
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plagued by (or plague themselves with) problems in living. If we were
in fact successful in our quest for full understanding, we would have,
by definition, established a chain of causal connections between antecedent conditions or events and the problems under which people
labor, thereby establishing the validity of determinism. Yet, the implications of such determinism for a profession such as social work
are profound, given the earnestness of our collective belief that individuals have a considerable capacity to shape their lives and futures.
We frequently view clients' problems deterministically-attempting to
locate intra- and extraindividual factors that account for problematic
behaviors and attitudes--yet our forms of intervention spring from
assumptions about free will and self-determination.25 As Tolstoy once
noted regarding this paradox, "The problem of free will from earliest
times has occupied the best intellects of mankind and has from earliest
times appeared in all its colossal significance. The problem lies in the
fact that if we regard man as a subject for observation from whatever
point of view-theological, historical, ethical or philosophic-we find
the universal law of necessity to which he (like everything else that
exists) is subject. But looking upon man from within ourselves-man
as the object of our own inner consciousness of self-we feel ourselves
to be free."'26There is thus an enduring tension between our desire
to understand and explain human affairs by uncovering detailed causal
connections and our need to see ourselves, and others, as autonomous
individuals who are not subject entirely to intrapsychic, biological, and
environmental factors that lie beyond our control.
Throughout the history of social work there has been some shift
between our emphasis on free will and determinism, largely as a function
of the passage of broader political, historical, and philosophical world
views. For example, there was considerably more emphasis on the
moral culpability of clients during the heyday of the Charity Organization
Society than during the subsequent growth of the settlement house
movement. This was the result of a growing recognition that poverty
and its correlates are frequently the result of external determinants,
not failures of individual character.27 The politics of the Progressive
Era were in sharp contrast to those that sanctioned and encouraged
the nineteenth-century free market philosophy that depended heavily
on assumptions of free will, self-determination, and individual autonomy.
The disconcerting events of the Great Depression of the 1930s also
shifted considerable weight toward the determinism side of the scale,
as did the popularization of Marxism and the noteworthy influence
of Freudian views of human behavior that captured the attention of
the social work profession. Currently, we appear to be in the midst of
a partial ideological shift away from determinism-at least as reflected
by contemporary social welfare policies promulgated by federal and
state politicians, legislators, and administrators-toward the view that

Free Will-Determinism

641

many of our domestic problems (e.g., poverty, crime) could be solved
if only we had the (free) will to confront them.28
The main point is that these broad shifts in world view have always
managed to plant ideological seeds in social work, and the outgrowths
have had significant effects on the resources available to and strategies
of the profession's practitioners. In general, the greater the emphasis
on determinism, the greater social workers' emphasis on social change
has been; the greater the emphasis on individual autonomy and free
will, the greater the profession's emphasis on casework and client selfdetermination. As the philosopher R. F. Stalley has observed, "the
main effect of the acceptance of a doctrine of determinism with all its
implications would probably be to turn the attention of social workers
away from casework with individuals to other kinds of social action. ... If, on the other hand, human behaviour is not determined
by the environment there will still be some problems, however much
the environment is improved, and only work with the individual could
help to solve these."'"29
It is essential for social workers to appreciate the implications of
their embrace of the free will or determinism doctrines, whether in
their extreme or moderate forms. The views we develop of our clients'
moral responsibility and capacity for change are a function in large
part of the position we take in the free will-determinism debate. It is
unlikely, of course, that this debate will ever be fully resolved. As
Tolstoy noted, there is something compelling about both theses. There
is incontrovertible evidence that much of human action is affected by
forces that extend beyond individual control and choice. Nevertheless,
it is hard to imagine that determinism does not have limits, that human
beings do not in fact maintain some degree of nontrivial control over
their own lives, even if some of what we call autonomy is an illusion.30
The physical and natural sciences by now have an impressive collection
of data and theories that explain large numbers of phenomena in our
world, a record that surpasses by far the accomplishments in the social
sciences. Laplace's early observations concerning particle mechanics
in physics served as the forerunner of a proliferation of deterministic
accounts of both physical and social events. However, despite the
noteworthy achievements of the world of science, when we aggregate
our findings we have failed to explain adequately many of the phenomena about which we care most. We still know distressingly little,
for example, about why some people neglect their children, abuse
drugs, become depressed, commit crimes, and take their own lives.
Our multivariate analyses frequently turn up little beyond the obvious,
ultimately explaining, in too many instances, a discouragingly small
percentage of the variance in our dependent variables. We know a lot
as a result of our decades of empirical inquiry, but we must recognize
that the boundaries that enclose our current knowledge are still relatively
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narrow. We are far from a true determinist's understanding of the
world in which we live. And, as the Oxford philosopher Anthony
Kenny has reflected, there must be a certain modesty in our expectations:
One may query whether we have any reason to believe that there can be a
successfulscience of human behavior;but this response will no doubt appear
unhelpful and pessimistic.It may be more productive to inquire from what
features of the history of scientific progress one is supposed to extrapolate.
Is one to point to the success of deterministic explanation in Newtonian
mechanics, or to its lack of success in stimulus-responsepsychology? It is
impossible not to be impressed by the present availabilityof mechanisticexplanationsfor many physicalphenomena which were explained teleologically
until the time of Descartes. But perhaps one should be no less impressed by
the continuing impossibilityof explaining, in terms of sufficient antecedent
conditions, any psychologicalphenomenon which would have been regarded
as voluntaryin the time of Aristotle.3'
The intractability of the free will-determinism debate has led to
some unfortunate frustration in our efforts to understand life's events
and design responses to them when problems arise. But the persistence
of the debate has also taught us important lessons. Controversies that
remain unresolved after centuries of sustained attention rarely concern
trivial matters. The free will-determinism debate endures because it
entails concepts that are fundamentally important. Even if our labored
attempts to resolve this debate do not settle the controversy, we will
have, in the process, addressed ourselves to matters that represent the
heart of our profession. In the final analysis, social workers will likely
continue to espouse a mixed or soft view of determinism, believing
both that clients' problems are, to a considerable extent, the products
of prior causes, and that the voluntary action of clients can contribute
to their problems and help to solve them. Assuming this to be so, the
personal conclusions we reach about the moral responsibility and capacity
of clients (whether voluntarily or as a result of our own historical
antecedents) stand to have significant consequences for the people
with whom we work.
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